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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARCUS W. JOHNSON d/b/a
l\IARCUS W. JOHNSON
PLUl\IBING AND HEATING,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JOE DOCTORMAN, CELIA DOCTORMAN and HARRY J. DOCTORMAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11442

APPELLANT''S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
The cn::-:c· on a1Jpeal herein involves the question of
whdher or not it is error for a trial judge to enter judgJll('nt for lllaintiff against defendants based upon findiJ1g" ot' fad a11d condnsions of law, and then upon mot:un of d(•frndanh; Yacafr the judgment and re-open the
c-as(' for furtlHT tei"tirnon~' in ordl'r to enter judgment in
f'arn1· ot' ddl'mlnnts ancl against plaintiff, thus having
\lif' '.'f'f(•d of' cfoqJosing of plaintiff's judgment by an aptlH' controYPI"S''
heard by
the SuJ:<al 11 :tJ1,>;tt h:win<r
h
·'
•
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The above captioned case was tried before the Honor.
able Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court sitting without a jury. At the conclusion
of the evidence the trial judge took the matter under advisement, and on l\Iay 7, 1968, granted plaintiff judgment in his favor and against defendants for the sum of
$2,651.84, representing $2,256.89 as reasonable value of
his services plus interest of $394.95 and costs. The judgment was based upon findings of fact and conclusions
of law signed the same day as the judgment.
Thereafter, counsel for defendants made a Motion
for New Trial, and after memorandums were submitted
by counsel for both parties the court made in writing its
hand written decision which was not filed and upon which
its Order of November 6, 1968, is based. The written Decision is attached to this brief and made a part hereof
by reference as an appendix. The Decision is a reversal
of the court's judgment of May 7, 1968, but the Order
of November 6, 1968 states that the case is re-opened
for the purpose of further additional testimony. The
findings of fact and conclusions of law were not strick<-n
or vacated.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The relief sought on appeal is that the Order of
November 6, 1968 based upon the court's writit:_'n Decision
dated October 9, 1968 be reversed and the court's judgment of May 7, 1968 be reinstated.
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S'l1ATE~LI£NT

OF FACTS

Deft>ndants are the ff\vners of certain real property
located at 2910 South Second vVest and 2912 South Sec011d West, Salt Lake City, Utah; the building that was
<'ventnall;' built on property located at 2910 South Second
\Vl·st vrns commonly known as the Barlow Building, and
t!te building that was eventually erected at 2912 South
;-)pcond \Vest ·was commonly called the Johnson Building.
(R 71)

Through thPir agent Franz Stangl, defendants were
iooking for a leaseP to occupy 2912 South Second West
\\·ith an offrr to build on that site to suit a prospective
tPnant: howPwr, they ·were not willing to build first and
thf•11 tincl a tenant after.

Qnalit:· Constrnction Company of Salt Lake City, of
\rhielt ~\Ir. Franz Stangl was a principal, was to be the
~"l1Pral eontrador on both the Johnson and Barlow
Buildings, nnd plai11tiff, Marcus vV. Johnson, was a sub('Ontrador for Quality Constrnction Company in relation
to tlw doing of the plumbing work on both the Johnson
antl tlw Barl<n\' Buildings.
Mr. Franz Stangl discovered a prospect, Marcus W .
.Tohnson, and after discussions with him obtained his
s;g·natnrt• 11pon a written agreement for Mr. Johnson to
!('asp tliv lrnilcling whielt was to be contracted for five
:-·1 am at $:250 iwr month, ·with some additional oral und1r.<bt,1d ing rPlating to the plans and specifications.
'l !Jt' dd'rn(lants agrt>Pd to give a $3,000 credit on the
1'<1:t j,, :,Jr .. folrnsnn for certain plumbing work that he
1
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agreed to perform on the Johnson Building and the Barlow Building that the defendants were going to construct,
the Johnson Building Leing the one that was to be leased
to plaintiff. The work performed had n'asonable value
of $2,256.89, leaving a gain to the plaintiff of $743.11.
Defendants encountered difficulties in obtaining a
building permit and in taking care of other preliminar~
requirement and did not begin construction on the building until after the date plaintiff ,,-as to take possession.
namely October 1, 1964. (R 72)
After the breach of said lPase hy defendants the dl'fendants continued with their building plans and operations and plaintiff did the plumbing work on the Johnson and Barlow Buildings, which plumbing work was
finally completed and inspected by l\[ay 15, 1965.
During the period between October 1, 1964 and April
1, 1965 plaintiffs' lease was tl::'nninated by its own tenu'
wherein he was leasing from one 0. B. Hanson, and a],out
December 1, 1904 plaintiff bt>came a month to month
tenant with an understanding betw<>Pn plaintiff and his
landlord, 0. B. Hanson, that the said Hanson's premise~
would not be satisfactory to the plaintiff and that Hanson
was looking for a tenant who would find the premis<''
suitable.
The 0. B. Hanson premises \d1ich plaintiff was otcupying would not be suitable any longer for plaintiff
because the State Road Commission was acquiring property for a freeway and intended to acquire part of the
property which was being nst>d hy plaintiff. During thl'
4

:-:anw pPriod ~Ir. 0. B. Hanson sold to the State of Utah
lo rt~· (+O) fret of front yard that plaintiff required for
tlH· prnpl·r 01JPration of his bm;iness. After the purchase
ot' tlw propPrty h~· the ~tate plaintiff realized that he
conld lw PxC'!uclt•d from the use of the said property at
an:: ti111<· and rPalizPd that as soon as the landlord 0. B.
1lanson found a iwrrnarn•nt tenant satisfied with the
:-:mallrr area lJ!aintiff's month to month tenancy would be
t<'rn1inat<>d. Plaintiff thus fonnd himself insecure with
n·fen·rn·<·to his location at that time. (R 73)
l>lll'ing the JH'riod of tinw that plaintiff was occupying tlw proj)('l't:·: of 0. B. Hanson on a yery tenuous basis,
(lt-frndants WPl'P far from finished with the constnlCtion
of tlt!' m>rk on tlw building, and at the time the insecurity
<l1·Y1,lo1H·d plaintiff eo1mrn•nePd to search for another lo"ation and found one, and during the month of April 1965,
:-:1·c·m<·cl it arnl ahandonPd any intention of occupying the
lmilding being eonr,;tructPd by defendant.
Plaintiff aclp1ired a new site for his business before
final insrH•ction of his plumbing work, and apparently
l11'f'on• h<' finislwd the work on said building. (R 73-74)
tlt<'

Pursuant to his obligation as a subcontractor of
Qualit~" Constrnetion Compan~· plaintiff completed the
pl urnhing \rnrk on tlw Johnson and Barlow Buildings,
m1cl npon <·01upldion of construction songht payment
from cldernlants for tlw labor and material on the job.
n.. ri.11daut:-: rd'us<·d to pa~· plaintiff, claiming that he had
l1r1·a('li1•d liis lPasp with them. Plaintiff thereafter brought
:-:nit to c·onqH·l pa~"lllPnt and ddendants counter-claimed
agai11:-:t him for ln·<'aeh of the lease.
,)

The matter was tried before the Honorable Joseph
G. Jeppson on April 5, 1968. After completion of the trial
Judge Jeppson found that defendants breached the lease
agreement with plaintiff by their failure to have tlw
premises ready on the date indicated in said lease, and
that plaintiff's action in proceeding to do the plumbing
work on both the Johnson and Barlow Buildings after
the breach did not constitute a waiver of the breach by
defendants, nor did such conduct result in an estoppel
barring him from claiming the breach by defendants. (R
74) Based upon this finding the court concluded as a
matter of law:
1. That the lease entered into between plaintiff
and defendants providing for plaintiff to occupy
a building to made available by defendants by October 1, 1964 was breached by the defendants and
became invalid because defendants could not d~
liver possession a.s specified in the lease.
2. That plaintiff in no way breached said lease nor
did any of plaintiff's actions result in a waiver b:·
plaintiff of the breach nor did any of his actions
estop him from asserting the breach of defendants.
3. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment in hie
favor and against defendants and each of them in
the sum of $2,256.89 with interest thereon at six
( 6%) per cent from May 21, 1965 plus the cost8
ofthisaction. (R74,75)
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants on .May 7, 1968 for the total
sum of $2,651.84 plus costs. (R 70)
Thereafter defendants made a Motion for New Trial,
claiming among other things that the court errt>d on
6

finding a breach of the lease on the part of defendants
without also finding repudiation, recision, rejection or
termination of contract on the part of plaintiff. (R 66-67)
Defendants' motion was argued and the trial court took
the matter under advisement, requesting that both parties
snbmit briefs. As requested briefs were submitted and the
trial judge made his handwritten Decision which was
either mailed or delivered to counsel. The decision, which
provides as follows, \\'as not made part of the court's
files and records in this case:

DECISION

163782
.JOHN~OX Y~.

DOCTORMAN

10/9/68

DPfendant breached the contract but it was not terminn tecl.
In continuing with the contract pl. would be entitled
to thl~ performance of the contract as far as defendant
J>Prfonns & damagt•s for the breach.

l >roof 1\·us not taken on plaintiff's damages. The
Vitse is l'POlH'ned for that purpose.
Plaintiff brPached & terminated the contract by moviJ1µ: into otlH·r premisPs & abandoning interest in the constrndion. l)pf. is entitled to specific performance of the
h•asl; snhj(·ct to lilaintiff's damages such as credit for
111ontlts hpfon• hnilcling was ready, costs incid<>ntal to
rli•laY.
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For disregarding a general rule see Cox vs. Berry
Ut. #10744 8/24/67 (sic.)
It is plaintiff's contention that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment based thereon
were proper and correct and that the judgment should
be reinstated. Further, plaintiff contends that the Court'~
action in reversing itself upon defendants' Motion for
New Trial and re-opening the case for additional testimony in relation to plaintiff's damages is improper in
that it is in the nature of an appeal without adherence to
the prescribed appellate process.

ARGUMEN11
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY IT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND
AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

After the parties had presented evidence in support
of their respective contentions and aftl'r coum;el for the
parties had completed their argument, the trial judge
took the matter under advisement. On April 15, 19G8, the
Court entered ints Minute Order (R 57-GO) stating that
defendants' had breached the lease hecausl' of fail mt> to
deliver the premises on the day agreed. The leaf'e lwcame invalid by this failure on defondants' part. The
Court found that after the lease was breached by drfendants, they continued with their plans to erect the
buildings and plaintiff continued to do the plmnhing
work as a subcontractor of defendants ocrem•ral contractor. Each of the parties intended thPr<'after to <'nter into

8

a new lea~w agreem<mt with new tenns to be framed and
to he effective when entered into, but until that time there
was no binding lease. (R-58). Accordingly, judgment
based upon the Minute Order was entered by the Court on
May 7, 19G8, granting plaintiff judgment against defendants for the sum of $2,2651.84 which represented the
reasonab]p, value of his services for the plumbing work
done on both the Johnson and Barlow buildings.
On May 13, 1968, defendants made a motion to set
aside and vacate the judgment and grant a new trial or
in the alternative to make new Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Lmv and enter a new judgment or to
amend the l<'indings. (R 66-68) That motion was argued
on J nne 28, 1968, after \vhich the Court took the motion
1mdt-r advisement and directed counsel to submit briefs.
Authorities of Law were submitted and the Court made
its writtPn "decision" which was not entered as part of
UH~ n·cord but which ·was distributed to counsel for the
parties. 'rlw decision reverses the judgment of the Court
when•hy judgmt>nt was granted in favor of plaintiff and
directs that additional testimony will be taken on the
matter of plaintiff's damages only for purposes of set
off again::-;t the judgment which defendants will have against plaintiff for plaintiff's breach of the lease. The
order dated November 6, 1968, (R 92) is based upon the
Courts unentered written decision although it does not
]lllrport to be so.
'l 1 lw Court did not grant a new trial nor did it make
1ww !findings or Conclusions nor did it amend those
'' liieh it hacl already entered. However, the Court did, by
9

its handwritten decision, completely reverse the judgment which had been granted to plaintiff after trial of
the case, and it did so without further testimony being
taken and without having done so in response to any
specific motion by defendants.

It is plaintiff's contention that the action of the trial
court in reversing the jndgment granted to plaintiff a~
was done in this matter constitutes the disposition of th~
case by an appeal without having it heard by the appellate
court of our judicial system. In other words, the trial
court heard the evidence, accepted exhibits, heard argument by counsel and entered judgment. Thereafter upon
a Motion for New Trial by defendants, the case 'vas again
argued before the trial judge in an effort to have him reconsider his judgment and to re-try the case. The argument of the Motion for New Trial amounted to nothing
more than an appeal to the same court that had grantt·d
the judgment and with that court sitting as an appellatf'
court and not granting a new trial or vacating the findings and conclusions but of reversing the judgment which
had been granted and of taking additional testimony on
plaintiff's damage only so that any ~wt off plaintiff might
he entitled to could be deducted from the damages defendant would tw entitled to for breach of the leasP.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are as follows:
(1) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule

(i1, a new trial may he granted to all or any of the

partiPs on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following eanses; pro,-ided, however, that on a
motion for a n<'w trial in an action tried without
10

a jury, the court may open the judgment if one
has be~'n _entered, take additional testimony, amend f mdmgs of fact and conclusions of law, make
new findings and conclusions and direct the entry
of a new judgment:
( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
wrdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
( 7)

~rror

in law.

It is not quite clear whether defendants' Motion for
a New Trial is based on Rule 59 (a) (6) or 59 (a) (7) or
both. Iu either case, however, the requirements of the
rule are that either a new trial be granted or that additional testimony be taken and thereafter either amended
or new findings and conclusions be entered and a new
judgment based thereon. There is no provision in our
mies for a trial judge to make findings and conclusions,
(•nter judgment thereon and then leave the findings and
eonclusions undisturbed and reverse the judgment.
Th(•fl' can be no question that the granting or denying of a Motion for New 11 i·ial is a discretionary matter
,,·ith the trial court. U ptou;n Appliance & Radio Co., Inc.
cs. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P. 2d 826. However, the trial
rnnrt has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a
:-:howi ng of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59. Tan9aro i:s. Jlarn-ro, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P. 2d 390. Here,
l1owever, thP motion for new trial was not granted. The
j11dg11wnt was vacated hut the findings of fact and con(·lnsions of law were undisturbed.

11

The action of a trial court in granting a motion to
vacate a judgment is, generally speaking, within the
judicial discretion of the court. This discretion, howewr,
is not a loose, arbitrary, and unlicensed jurisdiction, nntrammeled by the observance of the methods prescribt>d
by the law. See 30A Am.Jur. Judgments Rec. 629 l't 8eq.
Cases where the trial court has opened, modified or
vacated a judgment have been found but appellant ha~
not been able to find any case where the trial court reversed its judgment without making new findings of fact
or conclusions of law or without having vacated tlw judgment and having taken additional evidence upon '.Vhich to
make new findings and judgment.
Appellant feels that the proceeding in which the instant judgment was reversed tantamount to the trial
court setting as an appellate court on its own judgment
and was not a proceeding for a new trial under thP lm1vi sions of Rule 59.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED ITS LEASE WITH DEFENDANTS.

Appellant incoqwrated by reference the fact::; and
argument as they may be iwrtinent into Part 11 of this
brief.
As a general ntlP the imrt,- first <ruilh of a snh'
·'
b
.
stantial hrearh of a contract cannot complaint if tlw otlwr
party thereafter refuses to rwrYorrn. !lilperi((l F. J11s. Co.
]2

vs. Coo.s County, 151, U.S. 452, 38 L. Ed. 231, 14 S. Ct.
379;Nakdimen vs. Baker (C.A. 8 Ark.) 111 F 2d 778;
Dalton vs. Mullins (Ky.) 293 S.W. 2d 470; Buckman vs.
Hill Military Academy, 190 Or. 194, 223 P. 2d 172.
He can neither imist on performance by the other party,
nor maintain an action against the other party for subsequent failnre to perform. Loudenback Fertilizer Co. vs.
Tcnnes.see Phosphate Co. (C.A. 6) 121 F. 298; Buckman
cs. Ihll Military Acadcniy, supra, Lynch vs. McDonald,
12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P. 2d ±64.
One -who first wrongfully violates a contract has no
standing in court to recover for the violation of the contract by the otht>r party thereto. Yazoo & M. Valley R.
Co. t'S. Scarle.s, 851\Iiss. 520, 37 So. 939.
Where a contract is not performed, the party who
is guilt,\' of the first breach is generally the one upon
whom rests all the liability for the non-performance.
An1..'ll :llin. Co. 1·s. Humble, 153 U.S. 540, 38 L. Ed. 814,
14 S. Ct. 876.
It is also trne that a party who has himself been
guilty of the first substantial breach of contract cannot
rPscind tlw contract because of the subsequent refusal or
failure b.\- the other iiarty to perform. See Williston, Contracts 3 ]j~d., SPcs. 812 et seq. Also 17 Am. Jnr. 2d, Secs.
3G;), 425.
'rhe trial conrt found that defendants breached the
lPasr, that the breach was material and that plaintiff
was damaged thereby. BPcause of defendants' material
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breach they cannot compel performance of the lease by
plaintiff or seek damages for his non-performance.
Defendants claim that the trial court could not find
a breach of the contract on the part of defendants without also finding repudiation, rescission, rejection or t('rmination of the contract on the 1mrt of plaintiff. S11ch
a position is not based on the lm,-.
Repudiation, rejection and rescission are all ways of
terminating a contract. So, however, is faithful compk•tion of the contract by the parties. However, n•scis:;;iu11
terminates the contract and put::; the parties back in the
position they were in before the contract was entered
into and does not concern itsl·lf with damages. vVlwrea~.
a breach of the eontract hy only one party relieves th1"
other of performing and also entitles him to damagt~.
Here, plaintiff was not seeking a rescission of tlw contract and defrndant could not seek a n•scission heeause
of tlw mate>rial hrt>ach of the lease. Therefore a finding
hy the court of rescission, rejection or re1mdiation of
the contract plus a breach wonld haY<> been error.
The very idea of rescinding a contract implil•d that
what has been parted with shall bl~ restored on both side~.
and henee the general rule, which is to he n•asonabl:1 applied is that a party ·who wishPs to rescind n contraf't
must place the ovposite party in statns quo. S<:•e 17 Arn.
.Jnr. :2d Contracts, St•c. 512 et ::wq. and the easl'S thP1 1
cited.
An attempted re::;toration of tlw status quo is an
essential part of tl1e rescission of a eontrnd, and in ac14

cordance with the general rule requiring restoration, a
party cannot rescind and at the same time retain the consideration, or a part of the consideration, received under
the contract. See 166 A.L.R. 394.
If the defendant has failed altogether to perform an
essential part of an entire contract, the plaintiff may restore what he has received, and for sake of the remedy
treat the contract as rescinded. Luey vs. Bundy, 9 N.H.
298.

CONCLUSION
It should be obvious that a breach of a contract gives
rise to a cause of action on the part of the party not
breaching and also excuses non-performance thereafter
by him. He may rescind the contract, restore the consideration and desire to be placed in the position both
parties were in before the contract was entered into, or
he may sue for damages and be excused from performance thereafter.

The trial court could not, as defendants contend, be
compelled to find rescission of the contract coupled ·with
a finding of breach, but would have to find only one. As
a practical matter the result to defendants in this case
wonld he the same, for they lost their right to compel
performance by plaintiff or to treat the contract as srtill
b0ing in existt~nce because of their breach.
Plaintiff's damages because of defendants' breach
of the lease was the reasonable value of the plumbing
sc·rvices p(_'rformed by him. By breaching the lease the
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defendants thereby lost the right to compel plaintiff to
perform, the measure of plaintiff's damages is the
reasonable value of his services for the plumbing he pPrformed.
If the plumbing performed by plaintiff is lield to be
consideration for the lease then dt>fendants' breach of
the contract is sufficient reason for the conrt to find the
contract terminated and rPtnrn plaintiff's consideration
to him and it is not necessary for the trial court to find
both a breach and rescission of the contract as claimed
by dtifendants, but a finding of tiither one is proper under
the law.

Further the action of the trial C'Ourt in reversing the
judgment entered after the compltition of the trial had
the effect of allowing defrndants an appeal ·without following proper appellate procedure.
Plaintiff respectfully pray::; the court to reinstate
the judgment entered by the trial court on l\Iay 7, 19GS,
and to revtirse the Orel Pr of the trial court dated N onrnher 6, 1968, based on its unfiled handwrittPn dt>cision.
Respectfully submitted
Kipp and Chri::;tian
D. Gary Christian

Hi

